Sprekers

Eavesdropping on quantum cryptography using tailored bright light

Lars Lydersen, Norwegian University of Science and Technology and the University Graduate Center

Abstract

Cryptography is the art of encoding messages such that they are only readable to the intended parties. Quantum cryptography has been proven completely secure: the best any eavesdropper can do is to try to guess the message being sent. In particular, any attempt to intercept and read the quantum bits (qubits) will fail. The peculiar laws of quantum mechanics postulates that measuring a quantum state will also change the quantum state and that qubits cannot be copied. Therefore, any attempt to measure the qubits will introduce disturbances on the line, and reveal the eavesdropper. In practice, photons (single light particles) are used as qubits, and transmitted over optical fiber.

In my lecture, I will first explain how quantum cryptography works. Then I will explain how we have broken the security of several state-off-the-art commercial quantum cryptography systems through a variety of security loopholes. The eavesdropping techniques includes controlling the single photon detectors using tailored bright illumination.

Biography

Lars Lydersen, Norwegian University of Science and Technology and the University Graduate Center

I live in Hamar, Norway and am a PhD-student at the Quantum Hacking group at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in Trondheim, Norway and the University Graduate Center of Kjeller, Norway. I received my Master’s degree from the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in 2008, with one semester from TU Delft in 2005. The topic was the security of quantum cryptography with detector efficiency mismatch. Although quantum cryptography offers perfect security in theory, it remains an open question whether quantum cryptography can be implemented securely. The master thesis closed a critical security loophole.

In my PhD-thesis I perused the same question: can quantum cryptography be implemented securely? After a few theoretical publications on security proofs incorporate various imperfections, I moved on to hacking experiments on state-off-the-art commercial quantum cryptography systems, trying to find loopholes in the systems. This led to ground-breaking publications, shocking the research community by showing that the commercial quantum cryptography systems were in fact completely insecure. This is considered a crucial milestone to achieve practical secure quantum cryptography.

On my spare time I like endurance sports like running, cross country skiing and biking as well as wine and food.

De iets minder zonnige kanten van de zon

Frans Snik, Sterrenkundig Instituut Utrecht

Abstract

De zon is de enige ster die we in groot detail kunnen bestuderen. Het
is tevens een van de weinige sterrenkundige objecten die invloed
heeft op ons dagelijks leven. We nemen allerlei dynamische,
magnetische processen waar in de atmosfeer van de zon, die soms tot
gigantische explosies kunnen leiden. Zulke zonnevlammen en
zonnestormen zijn nog grotendeels onbegrepen en kunnen behalve
noorderlicht ook allerlei ellende op aarde veroorzaken. De
zonneactiviteit zal weer gaan toenemen in de komende paar jaren en
dat kan vervelende gevolgen hebben voor onder anderen automobilisten
die niet meer zonder navigatiesysteem kunnen, vliegtuigpassagiers,
astronauten en met name ook Canadezen en Spanjaarden.

Van electromagnetisch terrorisme tot electromagnetische veiligheid

Frank Leferink, Thales Nederland

Samenvatting:

Electro-magnetisch storingen zijn meestal alleen maar lastig. Bliksem kan electronica vernietigen of een mobiele telefoon veroorzaakt het prrp-prrp geluid op je radio. Dat noemen we electromagnetische interferentie (EMI). Maar je kunt ook gebruik maken van ‘storingen’. In Afghanistan worden bermbommen onschadelijk gemaakt door middel van een high-power-microwave bron, een soort omgebouwde magnetron met een antenne. Deze veroorzaakt een zeer hoge veldsterkte bij de bermbom waardoor die bom defect raakt. Een eenvoudige versie van deze intentional-EMI bron is de zogenaamde RFID zapper. Dat is een omgebouwd fototoestel waar de flitslamp is vervangen door een antenne. Deze wekt een sterk veld op waardoor RFID tags in kleding, boeken e.d. defect raken. Een tijd geleden kon je met een omgebouwde peizo-electrische aansteker een gokkast op hol brengen. Erg leuk. Jammer genoeg hadden de gokbazen in Las Vegas een andere mening, dus nu lukt het niet meer.
In deze presentatie worden diverse voorbeelden van Intentional-EMI getoond, en worden maatregelen om de stoorgevoeligheid te verbeteren besproken.

Biography Frank Leferink

(Prof.dr.ir.Ing) Frank Leferink,
B.Sc 1984, M.Sc. 1992, PhD 2001, Prof. 2003.
Since 1984 employee of THALES Netherlands; Now Technical Authority and reponsible for EMC activities within THALES Netherlands. He is manager of the (virtual) Center of Excellence on EMC, comprising the group of more than 100 EMC engineers within the THALES group located at appr. 30 sites in France, United Kingdom, The Netherlands, Italy and Germany.
Since 2003 he is (part-time, full-) professor EMC at the University of Twente. He is acting chair of the Telecommunication and EMC group, with 6 staff and 12 PhD researchers, 7 of them are involved in EMC research. He published over 150 papers. He is teaching EMC and Transmission Media courses, and he is involved in training activities towards professionals. He is chair IEEE EMC Benelux, member of ISC EMC Europe, and associate editor of the IEEE Transactions on EMC. His main interest areas are EMI at PCB and IC level and innovative test techniques, such as reverberation chambers.

http://utep.el.utwente.nl/~leferinkfbj/index.htm

How safe is the OV-chipcard?

Robert Meppelink, Collis

In The Netherlands, we can enter the public transport using an electronic
ticket, the so called OV Chipkaart. At Collis we have years of experience
with the Dutch OV Chipkaart and similar systems in many countries, e.g.
Germany, Singapore and New Zealand.
In December 2007 it was shown that the security of chip used for the OV
Chipkaart, the MIFARE Classic chip, could be compromised. During the last
years there has been a lot of media attention for hacking the OV
Chipkaart, and multiple ways to commit fraud have made it to the
headlines.
In this talk we will give insight in the background of the security
issues in the Dutch OV Chipkaart. We will elaborate on the current status
and try to relate the actual issues to the recent reports and articles in
the media. Furthermore, we will discuss potential countermeasures to
prevent fraud in the (near) future.
The presentation will be given by Robert Meppelink. He started to work
for Collis in January 2010, after receiving a PhD from the University of
Utrecht on the subject of “Hydrodynamic excitations in a Bose-Einstein
condensate”.